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Abstract 
In this paper, 3- and 4-secure codes are constructed 
from combinatorial designs. Both constant weight and 
non-constant weight codes are shown.   
 
1.   Introduction 
Collusion secure fingerprinting codes are introduced 
by Boneh and Shaw [1]. A fingerprint is a string over 
an alphabet. A fingerprinting code is a collection of 
fingerprints and is used to protect the ownership of 
digital objects. A fingerprint is embedded into a copy 
of the digital object, when the copy is sold, in such a 
way that each fingerprint is unique to a copy so that the 
distributor of the object is able to identify illegal 
redistribution by extracting the fingerprint. The 
fingerprint is not known to the buyer so that it is not 
easy to tamper with. 
 
However, if one has multiple copies of the same object 
with different fingerprints, he may compare the copies 
and detect where the marks are different and he might 
be able to change the mark on the detected positions. 
Collusion secure codes are considered as a 
fingerprinting code with the following property. 
Suppose a pirate copy is found with a fingerprint not 
identical to any fingerprint from the fingerprinting 
code, at least one of the fingerprints can be traced with 
a high probability when the pirate copy was produced 
by a certain number of copies. Boneh etc firstly 
constructed [1,2] binary c-secure codes with a tracing 
error ε.  
 
In this paper we construct c-secure codes from 
combinatorial designs for c=3 and c=4. 
 
2.   Preliminaries 
Let Γ⊆{0,1}v be a binary code and C⊆Γ be a collusion 
of size c>1. Suppose  
        C={u1, u2, …, uc},   ui=(ai,1, ai,2, …, ai,v).  
Boneh etc [1,2] used a so-called Marking Assumption. 
It is assumed that the fingerprints can be only modified 
at the detective positions by a collusion. A detective 
position for C is a position j, 1 ≤ j ≤ v, where 
|{a1,j,a2,j, …, ac,j}|>1. 
Denote by 
    D(C)={j: |{a1,j, a2,j, …, ac,j}|>1}⊆{1, 2, …, v} 
    F(C)={(x1,x2, …, xv): xj=a1,j ∀j ∉ D(C)} ⊆ {0,1,?}v 
the symbol ‘?’ indicates a mark on the corresponding 
position is erased. The set F(C) consists of all strings 
produced by C subject to the Marking Assumption. A 
tracing algorithm A outputs a subset of Γ on any input 
x ∈ {0,1,?}*. It is expected that the chance of A(x) ⊆ 
C, for all x ∈F(C), is as high as possible. c-Secure 
codes are defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1 ([1,2])  
Let ε > 0. A code Γ ⊆ {0,1}v is called c-secure with 
tracing error ε if there exists a tracing algorithm A 
satisfying condition: if C ⊆ Γ, |C| ≤ c, produces an 
x∈{0,1,?}v, then Pr[A(x) ⊆ C]>1- ε. 
 
For binary strings  
                x=(x1,x2, …, xv),  y=(y1,y2, …, yv), 
denote 
                w(x)=x1+x2+ … +xv 
                µ(x, y)=x1y1+x2y2+ … +xvyv. 
If x=(x1,x2, …, xv), y=(y1,y2, …, yv)∈{0,1,?}v, we 
define w(x) and µ(x, y) as above by treating symbol ‘?’ 
as 0. Let Γ be a binary code, denote 
µ = maxu,v ∈Γ µ(u, v). 
Define a function T: {0,1,?}v→ 2Γ as 
T(x)={ui ∈Γ: µ(ui, x)=maxu∈Γ µ(u, x)} 
Let C={u1, …, uc}⊆ Γand x∈F(C). Suppose 
                 µ(x, u1) ≥ … ≥ µ(x, uc). 
Then µ(x,u1) ≥ w(x)/c. For any u∈Γ\C, we have 
          µ(x, u) ≤ µ(u1,u)+ … + µ(uc, u) ≤ cµ. 
It is obtained that T(x) ⊆ C provided that  
                         w(x)>c2µ                                              (1) 
and x ∈F(C). 
 
                                  Wang, Seberry, Wysocki, Wysocki, Susilo, Xia, Zhao & Tran in  
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (2003)
3.   3-Secure Codes 
Consider a block design (X, B) where |X|=v. For Bi, Bj 
∈ B, we define 
      µ(Bi, Bj)=|Bi∩Bj| 
      δ(Bi, Bj)=|Bi \ Bj |+ |Bj \ Bi | 
      µ=max Bi,Bj∈B,i≠ j µ(Bi, Bj)               
      δ=min Bi, Bj∈B,i≠j  δ(Bi, Bj) 
There is a one-to-one correspondence between a subset 
of X and a binary string of length v. We shall use the 
same notation for a block and the corresponding binary 
string.  
 
Let C={B1, B2, B3} ⊆ B. Then F(C) is written as 
follows. 
    F(C)={P⊆X: B1 ∩B2 ∩B3 ⊆ P⊆B1 ∪B2 ∪B3}. 
D(C) is partitioned into the following six subsets 
              B1∩B2\B3,    B1 \ (B2∪B3),                                             
              B1∩B3\B2,    B2\ (B1 ∪B3), 
              B2∩B3\B1,    B3 \ (B1∪B2). 
So we have 
     3|D(C)|=|D(C)|+δ(B1,B2)+δ(B1,B3)+δ(B2,B3). 
That is 
                      |D(C)| ≥ 3δ/2.                                        (2) 
 
Theorem 1 
Let ε>0 be given. If there is a block design (X, B) such 
that        
                      µ <
183
3
+ε
ε v                                      (3)          
then there is a 3-secure code with tracing error ε. 
 
Proof Let C={B1, B2, B3}, µ′=|B1∩B2 ∩B3|. Noted that 
v=µ+δ, inequality (3) provides 
                      9µ < 
2
3 δε 
Further from (2) we have   
                   9µ -µ′ <
2
3 δε ≤ ε |D(C)| 
Define a tracing algorithm A as 
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For x∈F(C), we have w(x)≥µ'. Considering (1) we 
obtain that 
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The theorem is proved.                                                   
 
4.  4-Secure Codes 
Let (X,B) be a block design and C={B1, B2, B3, B4} ⊆ 
B.  Then  
  F(C)={P⊆X: B1∩ B2∩B3∩B4⊆P⊆ B1∪B2∪B3∪B4} 
and D(C) is partitioned into the following 14 subsets. 
         B1∩B2 ∩B3 \ B4,       B1∩B2∩B4 \ B3,  
         B1∩B3 ∩B4 \ B2,       B2∩B3∩B4 \ B1, 
         B1∩B2 \ (B3∪B4),     B1∩B3 \ (B2∪B4),   
         B1∩B4 \ (B2∪B3),     B2∩B3 \ (B1∪B4), 
         B2∩B4 \ (B1∪B3),     B3∩B4 \ (B1∪B2), 
         B1 \  (B2∪B3∪B4),    B2 \ (B1∪B3∪B4), 
         B3 \  (B1∪B2∪B4),    B4 \ (B1∪B2∪B3). 
From this we have  
6|D(C)| 
= 3|D(C) | - |B1∩B2 \ (B3∪B4)| - |B1∩B3 \ (B2∪B4)| 
                 - |B1∩B4 \ (B2∪B3)| - |B2∩B3 \ (B1∪B4)| 
                 - |B2∩B4 \ (B1∪B3)| - |B3∩B4 \ (B1∪B2)| 
                 + δ(B1∩B2) + δ(B1∩B3) + δ(B1∩B4)                          
                 + δ(B2∩B3) + δ(B2∩B4) + δ(B3∩B4) 
Note that for any sets R, S, T, the following holds 
|R \ (S∪T)| = |R| - |R∩S| - |R∩T| + |R∩S∩T| 
Then we have  
3|D(C)| 
=δ(B1∩B2) + δ(B1∩B3) + δ(B1∩B4) + δ(B2∩B3)  
 + δ(B2∩B4) + δ(B3∩B4) - µ(B1∩B2) - µ(B1∩B3)       
 - µ(B1∩B4) - µ(B2∩B3) - µ(B2∩B4) - µ(B3∩B4) 
+ 3µ(B1∩B2∩B3) + 3µ(B1∩B2∩B4)  
+3µ(B1∩B3∩B4) + 3µ(B2∩B3∩B4)  
 - 6µ(B1∩B2∩B3∩B4) 
≥ 6δ - 6µ 
So it is obtained that 
                       |D(C)| ≥ 2δ-2µ                                    (4) 
 
Theorem 2 
Let ε>0 be given.  If there is a block design (X, B) 
such that  
                      µ < 
82 +ε
ε v                                       (5) 
then there is a 4-secure code with tracing error ε. 
 
Proof Let C={B1, B2, B3, B4}, µ′′=|B1∩B2∩B3∩B4|. 
Noted that v=µ+δ, inequality (5) provides 
                   16µ < ε(2δ-2µ) 
Further from (4) we have 
           16µ - µ′′ < ε(2δ-2µ) ≤ ε |D(C)| 
Define a tracing algorithm A as 
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For x∈F(C), it must be w(x) ≥µ′′. Considering (1) we 
obtain that 
        ε
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The theorem is proved. 
 
5.   Existence 
We shall show families of block designs with 
parameters satisfying (3) in section 5.1 and with 
parameters satisfying (5) in section 5.2.  
 
5.1  Families of 3-secure codes 
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We firstly show the existing group divisible designs 
whose parameters satisfy (3) and hence that define 3-
secure codes with constant weight. We secondly show 
the existing pairwise balanced designs whose 
parameters satisfy (3) and that define 3-secure codes 
with non-constant weight. 
 
Definition 2([3]) 
Let K and G be sets of positive integers and let λ be a 
positive integer. A group divisible design of index λ 
and order v, denoted by (K,λ)-GDD, is a triple          
(X, G, B), where X is a finite set of cardinality v, G is 
a partition of X into parts (groups) whose sizes lie in 
G, and B is a family of subsets (blocks) of X which 
satisfy the properties: 
1. If B∈B, then |B|∈K. 
2. Every pair of distinct elements of X occurs in 
exactly λ blocks or one group, but not both. 
3. |G|>1. 
 
If v=a1g1+a2g2+ … +asgs, and if there are ai groups of 
size gi, i=1,2, …, s, then the (K,λ)-GDD is of type  
                    ggg aaa ssL21 21  
If K={k}, then the (K,λ)-GDD is a (k, λ)-GDD. If λ=1, 
then the (K,λ)-GDD is a K-GDD. Furthermore, a (k,1)-
GDD is a k-GDD. 
  
Corollary 1 
Let ε>0. A  K-GDD defines a 3-secure code with error 
ε provided that 
                           v  > ε
ε
3
183 +  
Proof It is straightforward from theorem 1 by noting 
that µ=1 in a K-GDD.                                                                                                         
  
Theorem 3 ([3]) 
For any prime power q, there exists a (q+1)-GDD of 
type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1. 
 
If (X, B) is a  (q+1)-GDD of type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1, the 
cardinality of X is 
                 v=(q+ 1)(q2-q)+ q2=q3+q2-q 
For any given ε>0, a prime power q satisfying 
                 q3+q2-q ε
ε
3
183 +>  
exists and so does a 3-secure code with tracing error ε. 
The code has a constant weight q+1. 
 
Theorem 4 ([3]) 
Suppose that there exists a resolvable BIBD(v,k,1), 
which contains u mutually disjoint parallel classes. Let 
n=v/k. Then there exists a (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1. 
  
If (X, B) is a  (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1, the 
cardinality of X is 
                   nk+(u-1)=v+u-1 
which can be chosen  such that 
                   v+u-1 > ε
ε
3
183 +  
for a given ε>0. Hence a 3-secure code with a constant 
weight k+1 is obtained. 
 
Definition 3 ([3]) 
A pairwise balanced design PBD(K,λ;v) is a pair  
(X, B) where X is a set of v points and B is a collection 
of subsets (blocks) of X which satisfies the following 
two properties: 
1. If B ∈ B, then |B| ∈ K. 
2. Every pair of distinct points of X occurs in 
exactly λ blocks of B.  
 
When λ=1, the PBD(K,λ;v) is a PBD(v,K). Suppose 
k∈K. We say a PBD(v,K) has a mandatory block of 
size k if it contains a block of size k, and we denote 
this design by PBD(v,K∪{k*}). 
 
Similar to corollary 1 the following corollary is 
straightforward. 
 
Corollary 2 
Let ε>0. A PBD(K,1;v) defines a 3-secure code with 
error ε provided that 
                          v > ε
ε
3
183 +  
 
Theorem 5 ([3]) 
Let N≥3={n∈Z: n≥3}. Then a PBD(v,N≥3∪{k*}) exists 
if and only if v≥2k+1 except when  
1. v=2k+1 and k=0 (mod 2); 
2. v=2k+2 and k≠4 (mod 6), k>1; 
3. v=2k+3 and k=0 (mod 2), k>6; 
4. (v,k)∈{(7,2), (8,2), (9,2),(10,2), (11,4), (12,2), 
(13,2), (17,6)}. 
 
For any given ε>0, there is a v>(3ε+18)/3ε such that a 
PBD(v, N≥3∪{k*}) exists. From this design, a 3-secure 
code is obtained. The code has variety weights, one of 
the weights is k≤(v-1)/2. 
 
Theorem 6 ([3]) 
Let Nodd denote the set of all odd positive integers. Let 
v and k be odd positive integers that satisfy v≥2k+1. 
Then there exists a PBD(v, Nodd ∪{k*}). 
 
Similarly, a 3-secure code with variety weights is 
obtained from PBD(v, Nodd∪{k*}). 
 
5.2  Families of 4-secure codes 
We show families of block designs whose parameters 
satisfy (5) in terms of group divisible designs and 
pairwise balanced designs. These designs give 4-secure 
codes with constant and non-constant weight, 
respectively. 
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Corollary 3 
Let ε>0. A K-GDD defines a 4-secure code with 
tracing error ε provided that 
                               v  > ε
ε 82 +  
Let ε>0 be given, q be a prime power satisfying 
              (q+1)(q2-q)+q2 > ε
ε 82 +  
then the (q+1)-GDD of type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1 defines a 4-
secure code with tracing error ε. The code has a 
constant weight q+1. 
 
In the (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1, the cardinality of X 
is chosen  such that 
                       v+u-1 > ε
ε 82 +  
for a given ε>0. Then a 4-secure code with a constant 
weight k+1 is obtained. 
 
Corollary 4 
Let ε>0. A  PBD(K,1;v) defines a 4-secure code with 
tracing error ε provided that 
                              v > ε
ε 82 +  
For any given ε>0, there is a v>(2ε+8)/ε such that a 
PBD(v, N≥3∪{k*}) exists. From this design, a 4-secure 
code is obtained. The code has variety weights, one of 
the weights is k≤(v-1)/2. 
 
Similarly, a 4-secure code with variety weights is 
obtained from PBD(v, Nodd ∪{k*}). 
 
6.   Conclusion 
Since the first construction [1,2] of collusion secure 
codes given by Boneh etc., there have been a few 
constructions of 2-, 3-secure codes in [4,5,6]. We 
constructed families of 3- and 4-secure codes from 
combinatorial designs in this paper. The tracing 
algorithm is simple.  
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